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Timothy Keegan
The image of the countryside in South African historiography has
changed significantly in recent years. Earlier writers like C.W. de Kiewiet
and W.M. tfacMillan stressed the backwardness arid stagnation of the South
African countryside. The image of the isolated, introspective frontier as
the fons et origo "both of impoverishment ("black and white) and of racial
exclusiveness and animosity, dominates de Kiewiet's writing in particular.
Equally, Hack tenancy or the "squatting system' was in his view an index
of "backwardness and lack of enterprise. De Kiewiet draws a stark opposition
"between town and countryside: the former progressive, competitive and pros-
perous, the latter mostly 'semi-feudal', unchanging and poverty stricken.
These images dominated a generation of liberal thinking. -1-
More recent writers, faced with very changed circumstances, have
stressed,firstly, the ini t ial success of black tenant commercial production;
and secondly the vigour and strength of white agriculture, the rapidity of
i ts development under the auspices of a modern, industrial state, and the
"brutality of the suppression of the once prosperous "black rural economy.
In this process, the 1913 Natives Land Act is given pride of place as the
single most devastating "blow aimed at black peasant production. Earlier
writers stressed the rather more negative function of the Act in the demar-
cation of reserves and the entrenchment of terri torial segregation. More
recently, the significance of the Act has been seen more centrally in
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terms of i ts decisive role in the emergence of a white-dominated capitalist
agriculture at the expense of the black peasantry. 2
The more recent interpretations reflect to a far greater degree than
did the inter-war generation of liberals, the perceptions of those who were
involved in the agitations of the years "before 1913« In the view of con-
temporary whites, there was nothing stagnant or decaying about the "black
rural economy. To the white populists who largely forged the
'public opinion" of the day, the 'squatting system' was no moribund ana-
chronism. As far as they were concerned, whites on the land were engaged
in a life or death struggle for social and economic dominance.
But what has been missing from much of the more recent literature "by
and large is a sense of the dynamics of change and an awareness of local
specificity. When the focus is narrowed, what emerges is less a unilinear,
homogenous transition to capitalism, taking place in readily definable stages,
but a far more complex, ambiguous and multi-faceted process of change. In
particular, i t seems that the relationship "between state initiatives (inevitably
the primary focus of scholars who prefer the mega-view) and local transfor-
mations, is far from being an unproblematical one. Those whose methodological
horzons are largely confined to a scrutiny of official publications commonly
assume quite wrongly that parliamentary debates, commission reports and
legislative enactments precisely reflect as well as shape social reality in
rural areas. After al l , i t is altogether simpler to examine the details of
laws and the professed intentions of their progenitors, than to try to un-
ravel the complex social reality of which they are a product. But legisla-
tive initiatives often bear l i t t le relationship to what is practically possible
for the state to accomplish. Further, much public perception of rural social
reality as reflected in political agitation and debate is so encrusted with
ideology as to be highly problematical as historical evidence. If the
periodical crises of labour supply and the recurrent upsurges of agitation
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about the consequences of allowing blacks to gain control of the rural economy
are to be understood rather than taken at face value, we need to uncover the
social realities underlying the rhetoric.
This paper, then, is concerned on one level to examine the complex rela-
tionship between state action on the one hand, and social reality on the
other, in the transformation of the countryside in early industrial South
Africa. The specific focus of this paper in this respect in on the 1913
Natives Land Act, the most closely studied law in South Africa's history
and historiography. The study focuses on the white-settled rural hinterland
of the Witwatersrand, the industrial hub of southern Africa, incorporating
the northern and eastern Orange Free State and the southernmost districts
of the Transvaal. For i t was in the most advanced heartland of the arable
highveld that the 1913 Act had its most immediate resonance in the trans-
formation of rural relations.
The paper also investigates the dynamics behind the development of a
capitalist agriculture, particularly the cyclical, unsustained pattern
evident in the drive for accumulation and control of productive resources
by whites. Only at certain periods of financial boom and productive expan-
sion, as we shall see, did racial antagonisms and competition for resources
reach critical intensity. It seems that only under certain transitory and
recurrent material circumstances did the underlying antagonistic forces at
work rise to the surface of popular consciousness, resulting in a much more
explicit resort to force and state power. At such times there arose a
.rural
heightened awareness among/whites of the urgency of concerted action and
state intervention if whites were to establish dominance over the rural eco-
nomy. The implied goal was the establishment of capitalist agriculture
based on black wage labour; but this was not a practical possibility in the
early twentieth century. It was the extension of white control over black
labour, time, capital, skills and produce that was sought, and not
necessarily their total expropriation.
Purely economic explanations (in a narrow, functionalist sense) for the
recurrent assaults on the "black rural economy are unlikely to get us very
far. For a rational calculation of interests by individual white landholders
usually led them to conclude that the exploitation of 'black production in
sharecropping relationships involved lower risks, higher productivity and
3adistinct cost advantages in relation to capitalised farming. After all,
fully capitalised farmers almost always derived their capital from outside
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agriculture. Sustained, autochtonous accumulation from agricultural pro-
duction alone was very rare (hence the importance of state intervention).
Mastery at the point of production became a social or cultural imperative
for the white populists. It should not surprise us to find that private
"behaviour often conflicted with public perception - that despite the con-
demnation of black tenant production, many rural whites were reliant on black
tenants' resources and skills in some degree for their own survival and ac-
cumulation. Moments of crisis and catharsis in the rural political economy,
such as that which culminated in the passing of the Land Act, cannot be fully
understood if these subjective elements are overlooked. The populist mobili-
sation of racial consciousness was clearly a major feature of such periods,
and one which more abstract and schematic analyses are ill-equiped to appre-
hend. In short, the process of "class struggle*, so often invoked but not
explained, needs to be invested with some historical specificity.
The years 1693*95 constituted one period of heightened antagonisms and
competition between white and black on the land. These were years of expan-
sive financial conditions and heavy crop yields when the extent of cultivation
and the pace of productive activities increased rapidly amongst the black
and white farmers alike. Large cereal harvests depressed prices, put a
premium on wagon transport and made labour for reaping very scarce. Not
only were the many burghers who signed petitions in 1893 and 1894 (and who
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thereby secured the enactment of the Republican anti-squatting laws of 1895)
motivated by the spectre of "black competition for scarce transport resources
and competition on inelastic urban markets, but they also were enraged at
the great surge of African peasant prosperity and "blacks* increased inde-
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pendence from the need to render labour for whites. It was at such times
of accelerated accumulation amongst black producers, when they were able
to consolidate and extend their independence and their control over productive
resources, that the spectre of long-term economic decline and increasing de-
pendence amongst whites was most vivid. Without state intervention in
the protection and promotion of white controlled production and white ac-
cumulation, and in the suppression of the black rural economy, many considered
that white authority and control were in danger of collapse. The alien
land speculators and absentee landlords whose interests seemed to be opposed
or indifferent to indigenous white capital formation, were not to be trusted.
The political economy of white supremacy could not simply be assumed; i t
had to be fought for and actively forged under the new conditions of indus-
tr ial and financial capitalism. The white populists . who were at
the forefront of this struggle saw the dominance of foreign capital and
black control of market production as the twin-edged sword which was threatening
to overwhelm them.
The anti-squatting laws of 1895 (enacted in both the Free State and the
Transvaal) grew out of a similar set of circumstances as those prevailing in
1913 when the more far-reaching Natives Land Act was enacted. The laws of
1895 were designed to restate and tighten up the provisions of earlier laws,
restricting the number of black tenant families (defined as nuclear families)
allowed per farm to five. The laws were very much the product of those
seeking to protect the landless "l i t t le men' in Boer society from the conse-
quences of allowing prosperous inaependent black peasant communities to ac-
cumulate on the land of large landowners at the expense of the poor burghers.
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I.S. Ferreira, the representative for Korannaberg (Ladybrand district) in the
free State Volksraad and a spokesman for the populist sentiment, warned in
1897 of the alleged consequences of allowing African communities to accumu-
late on individual farms without restriction. The 'needy burghers* would
be oppressed as the landowners would simply fill their land with African
sharecroppers, he declared. 'Many foreign capitalists will then also buy
land in this country for that purpose, and the result will be tha-t within
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thirty years only a few burghers will be in possession of their land*.
There was seldom any real attempt to implement the law in the face
of opposition from absentee landlords and the big grain farmers, who relied
Q
on larger, relatively self-sufficient tenant communities for labour supplies.
But like the 1913 Land Act several years later and other such rural social
engineering legislation, the activities of the legislators were designed
to fulfill a symbollic, mobilising function, rather than produce a practical
code capable of regulating real relationships.
It was in large part the status of black commercial producers, most
obviously the sharecroppers working the soil without interference or super-
vision, usually on absentee-owned land, which riled white populist opinion.
However, it is likely than many of those who signed petitions objected to
such sharecropping arrangements were themselves increasingly dependent in
some degree or another on black-owned and -controlled means of production
and black productive initiative. From 1896 onward the rinderpest, drought,
the Anglo-Boer War, followed by another period of drought and trade depres-
sion eroded rural resources and drew the sting from the populist agitation
against the independent black tenantry.
But the half dozen years leading up to 1913 constituted another period
of financial boom and productive expansion in agriculture, a period of rapid
land division and of unprecedented state intervention in the promotion of
white farming. Particularly, it was a period of crisis in labour supply
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and in productive relationships, when agitation and concerted action against
the independent black tenant farmers reached a fever pitch. In this, these
years were not unlike the mid-1890s, albeit on a grander scale. The re-
mainder of the paper will attempt to uncover some of the motor forces be-
hind rural change during one period when circumstances in the political
economy at large and in the heartland of the arable highveld in particular
conspired to spark heightened conflict, social anxiety and employer mobili-
sation.
The intervention of the state in the provision of transport and marketing
facilit ies, of capital and credit, and gnerally in the propagation of im-
proved methods and techniques of production during the decade after the
Anglo-Boer War was a necessary precondition for the advancement of white
agricultural capitalism. But state intervention in colonial agriculture
was slow in bearing fruit. The greater access of capital of white farmers
as often as not meant greater financial vulnerability, and many landowners
were hard pressed to survive once the post-War depression had set in. This
was accompanied by a tightness in government finance which forced a severe
Q
cut back in aid to farming.
Nevertheless, by 1908 the tide was turning, and by the time of Union in
1910, a financial boom was once again under way. State aid to agriculture
increased correspondingly. The establishment of Land Banks in the various
South African colonies in the years immediately preceding Union in lyiQ of-
fered opportunities for farmers to raise loans at low interest rates from
the government.
In the years immediately after Union there was greater liquidity in
agrarian commerce and more generous provision of private loan capital than
had been the case in many years, perhaps ever. The magistrate in Bethlehem
wrote in 1910: ^Business has shown more vitality, money has been more plen-
tiful, old debts have been liquidated and financial corporations as well as
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an issue of great importance after Union, and the corporate landowners were
the strongest supporters of such schemes- A Select Committee investigated
the question of land settlement in 1910 and 1911» and a Land Settlement Act
was passed in the following year, providing for largescale state purchase
of private land. Just as Milner's land settlement scheme after the War
was partly fuelled fey large landowning (including mining) interests, so
the same interests were behind the schemes of the early 1910s.
In the same year as the Land Settlement Act was passed, a Union Land
Bank was established, incorporating the pre-Union "banks of the constituent
provinces. Its effects were mainly felt in the inland provinces, especially
the Transvaal. The reason for this was the unevenness of penetration of loan
capital. Very l i t t l e settled and improved land in the Cape was not already
encumbered with private mortgage debt to the coastal insurance and trust
companies by the end of the nineteenth century. The field of activities of
the Land Bank was therefore concentrated in areas, notably in the Transvaal,
where much land was relatively undeveloped and concentrated in corporate and
17
speculative hands. Here again the interests of the large landowners, seeking
to cash in on the greatest land inflation the country had experienced by selling
off to white land purchasers with access to Land Bank loans, is to be seen.
The Land Settlement Act and the Land Bank Act, both of 1912, were closely
related statutes.
There was plenty of incentive in these boom times to attempt to refor-
mulate terms of tenancy to the advantage of landlords. They sought to increase
their claims to tenant household labour, to restrict tenants* access to gra-
zing land, and to increase the surplus extracted from tenant production. As
a consequence of surging land values and the greater marketing and transport
opportunities available, white landholders were concerned to maximise their
profits from productive activities on their land, whether black tenants re-
mained the direct producers or not. In particular, demands on the labour
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of black tenants were greatly increasing, more especially as more and more
capitalised farmers took up land on the highveld, intent upon investing in
capital resources and directly controlling production. To a greater degree
than ever before, the independent black tenantry was seen as obstructing the
development of capitalist farming insofar as tenant production severely im-
peded the availability of labour to white farmers. Again, it was the share-
cropping tenantry on absentee-owned land, where tenant households were free
of supervision or control and had seemingly unlimited opportunity for accumu-
lation, which elicited the strongest condemnation, especially as their enter-
prise was frequently enriching foreign capitalists. It was not so much te-
nants* ownership of productive resources which propagandists railed against
- as long as they were harnessed to the profit of resident white farmers - ,
but rather the more explicit manifestations of black independence and pros-
perity. White farming was no longer as vulnerable and dependent as in the
post-Wax years, and populist opinion could again be mobilised against the
black rural economy.
This crisis in relationships between white and black was particularly
intense as not only was the capital base in the white rural economy expanding,8
the black rural economy was expanding too. Good seasons and the opening of
export markets for the increasingly predominant commercial crop, maize,
created new opportunities for black producers as well as for whites. The
rapid increase in the extent of land put to the plough not only implied an
expansion of white capitalist production, but also of black peasant production,
more especially on the still very extensive landholdings of absentees. In
the postVwar years of depression, the proportion of land in the hands of ab-
sentees, of creditors and speculators, had no doubt "been growing as resident
landowners succumbed to the pressures of indebtedness.
The black sharecropping tenantry thus reached its high point of profit
and accumulation, at precisely the same time that white agriculture was
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capitalising at a faster rate than ever before. The inevitable result was
that competition for resources reached critical intensity. The crisis in
relations between black and white on the land was a replay, on a larger
scale and with more actors, of the drama played out in the previous phase of
financial boom and productive expansion, that of the years 1893-95. This
time, too, the rural crisis was heading toward a legislative catharsis.
Attempts by landlords to reformulate contracts of tenancy to their
own benefit evoked considerable resistance and a great deal of trekking from
farm to farm, especially in the months following the winter harvest. J.A.
Sugden of Bethlehem district noted this as early as 1907, a year in which
rains were good and crops were heavy. He reported that complaints regarding
the scarcity of labour were becoming more frequent and noted that
the increased amount of work, which the Native squat-
ters are being called upon to do, is causing an un-
usual number of Natives to trek on to other farms,
in the hope of finding farms, where there will be
less work to do. 19
These kinds of complaints were general in the years under consideration.
The magistrate in Lindley reported in 1912 that several capitalised farmers
in the district had resorted to hiring Zulu migrant labourers under con-
tract from Natal labour agents after unsuccussfully having tried to intro-
duce new conditions of tenancy which involved the payment of small wages
to workers and in addition themselves ploughing and sowing plots for the
tenants' benefit. Local Africans had resisted this transformation to ser-
vile status, often with a large degree of success.20
The crisis of labour supply was reflected in a furious agitation which
found its chief expression in the correspondence columns of newspapers and
journals, such as the Farmer*s Weekly, a Bloemfontein publication launched
in early 1911* J*A. Jorissen, writing from the eastern Free State, provides
a sample of the genre, replicated in any number of similarly exaggerated
diatribes. *The real master,* Jorissen wrote,
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is the native. He is independent; his services not
purchaseable for money; won't hire himself out or
bind himself to any contract whatsoever. The only
course he is agreeable to is to sow on the half.
Whether the owner likes i t or not, he has to sub-
mit. - .The natives* hold over the farmers down in
these parts is absolute.21
We need not take these expressions of concern as reflections of objective
reality to realise that what was being described was a heightened level of
racial tensions and hostil i t ies in the countryside, as white farmers sought
to harness black labour and capital resources more tightly to their own
profit, and as black households sought to resist these transformations in
productive relationships. One manifestation of this was the repeated
complaints by white farmers that the organs of social control - the pass
laws, masters and servants laws, and the local courts and police who en-
forced them - were inadequate to their task.22 Sut no matter how coercive
were the laws, how politicised the court system and how pervasive the po-
lice function, they were unlikely ever to satisfy the demands of whites for
social revolution in the countryside.
If white determination to extract more and more black labour was one
manifestation of intensified competition for resources in these years, com-
petition for grazing land was another. The rapid increase in the numbers
of stock (white- and black-owned) on the farms in the years after about 1905
was another aspect of the crisis in productive relations. The recovery of
herds and flocks and their rapid increase after 1905 - unprecedented pro-
bably since the opening up of large-scale internal markets - provided alter-
native or supplementary access to commodity markets for many African house-
holds. For stock ownership implied opportunities for profit from sales of
livestock, hides and skins and wool. This tended to diminish African depen-
dence on other, more servile, means of access to cash incomes, and rendered
them less susceptible to debt bondage. As long as grazing land was available
to them, many African households loosened their dependence on rendering
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labour and on credit. Under these circumstances, many African households
were able to resist landlords' pressures towards increased labour service.
The explosion in the stock population can be explained by natural fac-
tors. The half dozen years after about 1905 saw good rainfall, and the
virtual elimination of many animal diseases by the administration meant that
the natural checks were no longer maintained, especially since the Free State
escaped East Coast fever completely at the very time i t was ravaging other
parts of the subcontinent. Economic boom meant a flood of wage income into
the black rural economy, which was generally invested in livestock. Given
the overgrazed state of Basutoland, excess stock was commonly sent over the
border on to Free State farms.
Not only did grazing rights greatly benefit the black tenant, but they
also materially penalised the white landlord whose access to grazing land
was correspondindly reduced. The situation was made urgent by the subdivi-
sion of farms and overstocking throughout the territory. Ladybrand farmers
were reported in 1909 to be seeking out stock farms in other parts of the
colony to purchase due to overstocking. In 1913* breeding stock was reported
to be unsaleable in Bethlehem for the same reason, and the price in conse-
24quence had fallen by 25 percent. The magistrate in Winburg, R. Har.ley,
wrote that in the past, when the land had been cheap, landowners had not
minded Africans who owned as much stock as they on their farms, but as the
farms were getting smaller there was less and less inclination to entering
tenancy agreements with Africans who grazed large herds and flocks. Never-
theless, many landholders lacked muscle to enforce their will, as they needed
the labour and often also the capital resources of black households.25
Many farmers were becoming increasingly conscious of stock breeds, too,
partly as a result of large-scale importations of pure-bred animals by the
Department of Agriculture for breeding. Many were unwilling to allow inter-
mingling of their own stock with tenants' rams, bulls or stallions. A Free
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State farmer wrote in
Look at the drawback to progressive farming while
natives are allowed to graze and breed any kind of
mongrel stock. • »Our Government is spending large
sums on the importation of pedigree stock, but what
real progress can be made until we have a law en-
forcing the castration of downright mongrels. 2 6
In order to avoid the danger of interbreeding, many white farmers were ob-
liged to allow African tenants on their land free access to their own
rams, bulls or stallions, on condition that no African-owned male animals
would be allowed on the farm unless castrated.27 With the rising value of
grazing land fewer and fewer progressive stock farmers were willing to make
this concession. I t was s t i l l common at this time for all stock to graze
together. But paddocking was becoming widespread, which made i t possible
to restr ic t tenants' stock to stony or overgrazed camps while landlords*
stock were rotated - a decisive innovation in many black people's memories.2^
It was not African stoekownership in general that whites railed a-
gainst, however. One of the major advantages of labour tenancy was the
use of the tenants* oxen during the ploughing season, a very common arrange-
ment. The more draught oxen available to the farmer, the more land could be
placed under cultivation. I t was those animals which were of less u t i l i ty to
landlords which they resented. Thus, a number of informants remember these
years as the time when goat herding came to an end at the behest of their
landlords, apparently because they were very destructive of grazing and
damaged trees, notably fruit trees. Ndae Makume remembers that this hap-
pened in 1913. Their fifty goats were sold for 10s each to speculators
travelling from farm to farm buying up the tenants* animals.29
Orders to tenants to reduce their livestock numbers caused much movement
by households from farm to farm. The white landholders* determination to
undermine blacks' independent access to wealth in livestock was often ob-
structed by the bargaining strength of tenants' households with considerable
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labour resources and productive potential. Again, this struggle for control
over grazing land was the cause of much hostility and bitterness between
white and black on the land.
An important index of the increasing insecurity felt by African te-
nants was the extent of black land purchase during these years in the Trans-
vaal, where, unlike the Free State, i t was permitted by law up to 191% In
the three years, 1910-12, according to information given to parliament, 78
farms were bought by blacks.30 In many cases black chiefs bought land off
the highveld on which they and their people had always been settled, but to
which absentee whites owned t i t l e . Cattle was subscribed by the chiefs*
followers for this purpose, and they often paid highly inflated prices for
the land* But in a significant number of cases, tenant families on highveld
farms banded together to buy land in the less developed regions of the Trans-
vaal highveld in anticipation of increasing pressures being brought to bear
on their commercial farming enterprises. In some such cases sharecropping
families of diverse origin were clearly involved in a degree of identity-buil-
ding, extrapolating back into the past an often spurious ethnic allegiance
in order to legitimise the new communities being formed. Networks of kin-
ship, imaginary as well as real, infused i t seems with networks of church
affiliation, formed the common factor in the large group of perhaps a hundred
or more Iree State sharecropping families who bought a farm, Swartrand (which
they called Mogopa), north of Ventersdorp in the western Transvaal. These
people identified themselves as subjects of the Koena chief, Mamogale, who
lived at Bethanie west of Pretoria, under whose patronage they sought out
the land which in 1912 they bought. They seem to have elaborated an ingenious
clan hierarchy based on often fictive kinship ties to the ruling lineage, and
on this basis organised the geography of settlement on Mogopa.31 In other
cases, such as the Motsuenyane and Ngakane families, smaller groups of close
kin - brothers, in-laws and cousins - pooled their resources and bought land
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without the mediation of a chiefly authority.32 All these land purchasers used
their considerable resources of livestock to buy the land. Many of the sub-
scribers did not move immediately to their newly acquired land, but sent
their excess livestock there. Purchase of freehold lots on the outskirts
of towns was also common at this time, such as at Top Location and Evaton
near Vereeniging south of Johannesburg. These viable and increasingly pur-
sued alternatives to life as tenants on white-owned farms was closed off by
the 1913 Natives Land Act. Clearly the pursuit of white supremacy on the
land was in jeopardy if the better-off black farmers could maintain their
independence and increase their security by resorting to the land market as
a weapon of resistance. ^
Amongst whites, as in the 1890s, economic crisis coincided with a gene-
ralised social anxiety about the fate of the *poor white*, an ill-defined
malaise centered on the supposed consequences of white 'degeneration* for
the whole system of racial domination and social control. The crystallising
and propagating of a sense of moral panic about the 'lapsed whites* - the
flotsam and jetsam of white rural society being thrown up during this period
of rapid social and economic change - intersected with the emergent crisis
of race relations on the land. The most evocative strand in the populist
agitation against independent black tenant farming was the assumption that
the very success of black farming on white-owned land was responsible for the
failure of so many whites to survive as rural producers. At this point the
crisis in rural relations became part of a larger, less tangible, more sub-
jective ideological crisis of racial survival and racial purity.
Landlords* preference for black tenants was a cause of alarm and anxiety .3
Typical was the complaint in a Bloemfontein newspaper against an Afrikaans
minister who asked the farmers in his congregation to plough two acres of
maize each to pay for a black church. The correspondent wrote:
In the same dis tr ic t , a white bywoner [tenant] * with
a small amount of stock, cannot obtain lands on the
half ploughing system, whereas nearly every farm has
natives who plough on the half, and in many cases
have more stock than the white man.
A story told by Barney Kgakane, who grew up in a wealthy sharecropping fa-
mily in the Vereeniging distr ict just north of the Vaal River, illuminates
the point. In 1912 the Prime Minister, Louis Botha, addressed local
farmers on Jan Muller's farm. Ngakane's father and uncles witnessed the
proceedings:
At the end of the meeting one farmer stood up and
asked a question of General Botha; whether i t was
right that there should be black people who were
living a life of comparative ease, when there were
hundreds of poor whites, Bywoners. And the answer
from General Botha was, *No . And then Cronje I the
Ngakanes* landlord] got up and he asked, *And, well,
gentlemen, I have seven bywoner3 on the farm and
seven black families, and I get from one of those
black families what I cannot get from the seven
bywoners together. And so are you going to ask
me to take food out of my mouth?* This was the
way he put i t . • .And the next thing that happened
there was that the farmers a l l said *Donner horn!*
[Beat him up!] They were going to assault Fanie
Cronje for saying seven white farmers could not
produce what one black farmer produced. And that
was the beginning. Pressure was brought to bear
upon Cronje after the meeting. . . 3 '
The Ngakanes soon found the pressures brought to bear on them were such that
in 1913 they bought their own farm in the western Transvaal. Of course their
landlord, Cronje, might well have had his.own reasons for tightening conditions
of tenancy. But i t does seem that widespread intimidation of sharecropping
landlords who allowed their tenants too much independence and latitude for
accumulation was taking place in these years. In the popular perception, the
black tenant farmers were a major factor in the impoverishment and marginalisa-
tion of large numbers of rural whites.
Younger Afrikaners, products of the emergent ^Christian nationalist '
education system under the auspices of the populist Afrikaans churches, were
particularly likely to be sensitised to the dangers implicit in the
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impoverishment of masses of rural whites. The younger generation was often
more susceptibel than their elders to the need for radical social and poli-
tical intervetion, if white supremacy was to be secured in an industrialising
economy, and if white rural accumulation was not to be crushed by imperial
capital on the one hand and the black rural economy on the other. The cul-
tural pressures being exerted on white landholders to take greater control
over production on their land and to exert their own mastery over black tenant
household members were growing rapidly.
A great deal of proselytising and agitating against the dangers impli-
cit in independent black accumulation and enrichment was conducted at spe-
cially convened farmers* meetings. In September '\9'\2t a congress was held
at Reitz, attended by 50 delegates from throughout the Free State, with a
view to establishing a Boerenbond to push for the destruction of the share-
cropping economy, the enforcement of compulsory master-servant contracts on
all tenants, and the stipulation of maximum remuneration for workers which
no farmer would be allowed to .exceed. K.W. Serfontein, member of the Pro-
vincial Council, captured the spirit of the occasion when he said that the
aim of the congress was to ensure the *natural r ights ' of white men and to
make South Africa a *white man's country'. A Boerenbond Congress met in
Kroonstad in February of the following year, attended by 65 delegates, with
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a view to pressuring the government to take action. This mobilisation of
farming opinion was fairly typical of these years. Farmers' congresses were
held in places such as Wepener and Bethlehem, where angry words were ex-
changed about the ^squatting evil ' and the impossibility of rehabilitating
the mass of impoverished whites while sharecropping arrangements were allowed
to persist .3 9
It was into this arena of struggle and resistance, of mounting social
anxiety amongst whites and insecurity amongst blacks on the land that the
1913 Natives Land Act - far~and away the most important legislative
intervention in the process of rural change in these years - was launched.
The major provision of the Act stipulated that the only legal form of rent
payment by black tenants to white landlords would be labour service. A
rent in the form of a share of the crop or in cash was henceforth illegal.
Secondly, the Act prohibited all land purchases by blacks outside specially
scheduled reserve areas - generally those areas which blacks had been able
to preserve from alienation (or had purchased back) - pending the proclama-
tion of released land for inclusion in reserves.
The implementation of the Act in the Free State was at first based on
the proposition that contracts were automatically terminated at the close of
each reaping season unless otherwise specified in writing. Thus the 191? Act
was not to be officially enforced before the 1914 winter harvest, since all
existing tenancy agreements were left to run their course,41 But many land-
lords took the opportunity in the winter and spring of 1913 of removing Afri-
cans who would not sell off excess stock or submit to landlord's authority;
and when the Natives Land Commission visited the Iree State in October 1913»
the effects were dramatically evident. Without the direct support of the
authorities and notwithstanding the precise provisions of the Act, it pro-
vided many landlords with an opportunity, a justification to organise and
issue ultimatums in pursuit of their own interests.
Evidence before the Land Commission .is replete with testimony of attempts
to dramatically increase labour service, of forced stock sales and summary
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evictions. In the winter of 1913 a great flurry of ultimatums was delivered,
much confrontation and recrimination echoed through the countryside and a great
trekking began. The incidence of expulsions after ploughing and sowing on
trifling pretexts increased greatly, Africans at the receiving end were ty-
pically the wealtheir tenants who owned more stock than the landlord was
willing to tolerate.
By October police reports indicated that about 150 families were leaving
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the Ladybrand d i s t r i c t , a l legedly on account of the law. The magistrate in
Winburg, R. Harley, reported tha t 30 African heads of households who had
been turned off farms hadiibeen to see him to ask advice *as to the bes t
way out of t he i r present t r o u b l e ' . P r ac t i c a l l y a l l had had large stock-
holdings. One had 60 head of c a t t l e , 140 sheep and 11 horses . The magis-
t r a t e in Bothaville in the northern Free State repor ted t h a t he had attended
three meetings in h i s s u b d i s t r i c t a t which represen ta t ives of over 400 t e -
nant families were p resen t . Complaints were made t h a t the government was
t ry ing to *cut the throats* of the Africans. *I t was maintained tha t Na-
t ives possessing considerable stock would have d i f f i c u l t y in obtaining
places of abode without s e l l i n g the i r s tock, and i f they did succeed in ob-
ta in ing employment t he i r remuneration would perforce be small . . . ' . Like-
wise, the magistrate in Heilbron, H. Heading, repor ted t h a t 450 uninvited
Africans had appeared before him, urging tha t summary ev ic t ions would cause
great hardship. %Already boys are trekking to the Transvaal from my d i s t r i c t
in considerable numbers,* said Reading. The pol ice in the d i s t r i c t had i s -
sued passes to 40 African families since the promulgation of the Act, taking
with them 380 head of c a t t l e , 593 sheep and 22 h o r s e s . 4 3
The magistrate i n Vrede had ac tua l ly to intervene with white farmers to
prevent them from expel l ing Africans u n t i l they could be provided for . *They
come to me and ask: ^What must we do? Where must we go?" In some cases I
have wri t ten to the master and asked him to allow the boy to s tay on u n t i l we
receive def in i te i n s t r u c t i o n s . ' A pass i s suer in Thaba Nchu d i s t r i c t , E.A.
Worringham, to ld the Land Commission that *I am da i l y i s su ing passes to na-
t ives who I know were l i v ing in my d i s t r i c t before the war. • . I t i s r a the r
the well-to-do nat ive who i s ge t t ing a pass to go in to Basutoland or e l s e -
where. ' But as Sol Plaat je discovered on v i s i t i n g the border d i s t r i c t s in
September 1913* the r a t e of influx of farm tenants in to Basutoland was
threatening to ser ious ly affect the *land question* t h e r e . The Kroonstad
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magistrate, R.C. Rosenzweig, reported that he had been approached "by Africans
applying (unsuccessfully) for butchers' licenses - clearly considered by
harassed stockowners with entrepreneurial skills to be an answer to their
dilemma. Forced stock sales inevitably depressed the market and provided a
44lucrative business for stock speculators.
Kev. C.Stuart Franklin, Wesleyan minister of Kroonstad, testified that
up to 1 October, 206 members of the church had been 'lost*. A few of them
had gone to Basutoland, although they had lived in the Free State for 40
to 60 years; a few had gone to Bechuanaland', but the larger number had gone
to Johannesburg.
In some cases these natives have experienced consi-
derable hardship, because they have had to leave
under pressure, and have had no time to remove their
effects, stock, and implements, which have been sac-
rificed. I wish I could make you realize the unrest
and the dissatisfaction which is in the minds and
hearts of the native people right throughout this
district. They think that this coming year will be
a year of terrible loss and deprivation to them.45
Similar evictions were taking place in the more advanced maize districts of
the southern Transvaal, despite the fact that the provisions of the Act were
suspended in that province. "From Potchefstroom it was reported that the
passing of the Act had 'stimulated trekking on an extensive scale from va-
rious parts of the southwestern districts, many natives, with their families
and stock having crossed over into Bechuanaland. *47
Africans complained that the farmers were taking advantage of the con-
fused state of affairs and of the Africans' ignorance of the law in order to
delude them as to the dimensions of the law. Blacks from Winburg petitioned
the Secretary for Native Affairs, complaining that they were being told *all
sorts of unfounded stories': stock speculators tried to convince them that
the Act obliged them to sell off their stock; farmers told them that ac-
cording to the law they now had use of the Africans' oxen and wagons free of
charge and that the tenant families had not to work without wages in return
2 2
for grazing. The magistrate in Bothaville wrote, *l regret to state that
some farmers have been endeavouring to make contracts most advantageous to
themselves and to force Natives to dispose of their stock.* One instance had
"been brought to his notice of a head of family being offered 2s 6d per month
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for the services of males under his charge and 1s per month for females.
These expulsions in the winter and spring of 1913» which were taking
place throughout the arable d i s t r i c t s , were frequently in breach of existing
landlord-tenant agreements, as we have seen. T.M. Mapikela, Secretary of the
OFS Natives Congress, told the Land Commission of cases in which magistrates
had referred expelled African tenants to lawyers, who had in turn demanded
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an in i t i a l payment of £50 before going into the matter. When the Secretary
for Native Affairs visited Winburg, he was presented a peti t ion by local
Africans who complained of the attitude of the local police, who always told
them to take their complaints to a lawyer. They appealed for the Native Af-
fairs Department to appoint local commissioners to intercede on tenants' be-
half.51
So, despite the polemical nature of some of i t , the evidence clearly
i l lus t ra tes the widespread occurrence of evictions which followed the passing
of the 1913 Land Act. Twenty years previously Africans who were ordered to
sel l their stock, render more intensive labour service or hand over a larger
proportion of their surplus product would.have been able to find alternative
arrangements under the patronage of a large landowner whose demands were less
intrusive. This was no longer possible for most. The age when capital is t
farmers were also large land barons was receding. The private labour reserves
of wealthy farmers were often being sold at high prices to farmers with access
to Land Bank loans, and being put to the plough. Much absentee-owned land
and many speculation farmers were gradually being sold off, or leased out to
whites. Land was too valuable for farmers to continue relying on access to a
supply of labourers from amongst junior members of large, wealthy and
independent tenant communities. The land crisis was coming to a head for the
black tenants in the heartland of the arable highveld. Blacks who decided
to move rather than submit to forced dispossession and impoverishment as
often as not discovered that there were no choices left . I t is probable
that those who submitted were no worse off in the end than most of those
who chose to join the army of trekkers in the winter of 1915•
More particularly, what this evidence in large part signified was the
fragmentation of extended settlement groups and the break up of large,
kin-based homesteads. Relations between white farmers with extensive land
holdings and the patriarchs of black settlement groups were breaking down.
The family seniors usually suffered most. They were often too old to work
and usually controlled the multi-generational family's often very substantial
herds and flocks. They found themselves in an invidious position and were
likely to be expelled sooner or later from the farm^ whereas juniors could
more readily find employment, which enabled them to re-establish contracts of
tenancy. Thus as often as not those in distress who were reported to be
wandering around the district appealing to magistrate and missionary for
aid and advice, were older men.
Ultimatums and evictions were not directly caused by the Land Act, though.
The formal prohibition of sharecropping in the Act was in large part inef-
fective, and indeed i t was not even implemented by the authorities - certainly
not in 1913* But the Act provided a catalyst to concerted action on the part
of landlords. White farmers involved in an intense struggle for control over
resources and human labour were not concerned with precise legal definition;
for them, the passing of the Act was a catharsis, an affirmation from the
highest authority of the legitimacy of their cause and the inevitability of
their victory against their black competitors. And they acted on that per-
ception. Legislatures often serve broader, less tangible functions than
that encompassed in legal theory.
But what were the dimensions of the transformation being wrought amidst
all this trauma? Once the great dispersal had run i t s course and black fa-
milies had re-established working relationships with landlords, new or old,
how had the patterns of productive life changed? Some black informants re-
call this as the time when landlords replaced a sharecropping system with
one in which the tenants worked two days on their own fields for four in the
landlord's fields - although usually s t i l l using their own oxen and equip-
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ment. No doubt more white farmers felt able to exert greater authority
over production once the Land Act and the great dispersal of 1913 had pro-
vided the resolve and the incentive insofar as they cpuiii reserve good arable
land for themselves while banishing the tenants to stony ground, or reserve
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manure for their own use. The price they had to pay was far greater super-
vision and enforcement of work-discipline. Splitting the arable did not
necessarily imply a decline in landlords* reliance on their tenants* pro-
ductive resources and skil ls . Deskilling only came with mechanisation of
peak seasonal activities, which was s t i l l a long way off. There was no
widespread revolution in the productive processes, no general stripping of
black tenants* means of arable production, no universal undermining of pea-
sant skills and household labour organisation, as long as tenant households
continued to own the capital resources necessary for preparing the soil and
planting the crop. The more labour intensive processes, weeding and harvesting,
which not only required minimal capital investment, but also lent themselves
more readily to gang labour (or communal work parties) rather than household
labour organisation, were the activities which landlords were most readily
able to bring under their direct control. Commonly, explicit sharecropping
arrangements gave way to "ploughing and sowing* contracts, often also including
the use of tenants' wagons for transporting the crop.
In short, the boom in rural areas in these years did not mean the uni-
versal capitalisation of white agriculture. Certainly, many farmers were able
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to buy improved implements, such as wheat reaping machines or planters. But
for many more, there were limits to the benefits to be derived from investing
in productive resources while the technology at the disposal of whites was
not substantially different to that used by black households, especially
ploughing spans and equipment, and while the weeding and reaping of the most
important crop (maize) remained labour-intensive activities. The advantages
of less relative risk and greater relative productivity associated with
sharecropping did not disappear. In the absence of widespread opportunities
and motivation to mechanise (as was the case a few decades later) there was
l i t t l e incentive to suppress the peasant economy entirely.
Hence for many landholders, splitting the arable into landlord's and
tenants* fields was not a viable option, mainly because they were not able
or willing to provide the sort of supervision which such an arrangement re-
quired. This clearly applied to absentee landlords. Many poor whites con-
tinued to survive on the land by hiring farms and battening on to black te-
nant production, over which they exerted no direct control. Many landholders
saw no incentive to exert greater control over production, given the risks of
capital investment and the lower productivity of alienated labour. Many
would have agreed with Wepener farmers who at their congress in January 1909
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argued %separate lands would be a curse to the landowner . As early as 1908,
the ORC Natives Administration Commission had perceptively concluded from i ts
investigations that i t was not possible to frame preventive legislation
against sharecropping which could not be evaded, *and that to attempt to en-
force such legislation would only drive the farmer to resort to subterfuge
CO
and evasive expedients*. In the event, that expectation was fully borne out.
As the magistrate in Vredefort reported in 1918: \ . .the great idea of the
natives is to plough, sow and reap on their own account. The Natives Land
Act has not materially altered the relationship that previously existed be-
59tween the European master and the natives. . .in this respect.'
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as well as his personal service - to count the service of his oxen, which
are to be used in consideration of his occupying the land'. A.H. Maree
of the sajne district agreed. Oxen service should be allowed
as long as it can be proved that the service of the
oxen has not been given in lieu of rent. As long as
the boy gives his service and is willing to assist
his employer with the help of his oxen, I do no think
you can take that as rent.63
The government's law advisors' conciliatory and meaningless response
was that oxen service was only illegal if included in the contract as a
condition of tenancy.64But legal argument was essentially irrelevant; the
Act, like so much social engineering legilsation, was a statement of ideals,
a declaration of intent, a call to action by dominant classes, rather than
a formal legal code. Legal debate was taking place in a vacuum divorced
from social reality. Whatever the law advisors and in subsequent years the
Supreme Court might decide to be the correct interpretation of one or other
provision of the law, the effect on what was happening in the real world was
minimal.
Nevertheless, it would be quite wrong to discount the Land Act as a
powerful factor in shaping the future development of capitalism in the country-
side. For there was another aspect of the Act which was crucial in strengthe-
ning the position of capitalising landlords. The Act laid down that all black
tenants were to be defined as servants under the 1904 Masters and Servants
Ordinance, and not just individually contracted employees working for a cash
wage. This had considerable implications for the legal status of the tenants
and for the criminal sanctions that the farmer could summon to his aid against
recalcitrant or unwilling workers. For J.G. Keyter, MLA for Ficksburg and
a major protagonist of the 1913 Land Act, it was this consideration which was
paramount. In response to comment that the effect of the Act would be to
split the lands worked by the tenant into tenant's lands and landlord's without
any change in the relations of production, Keyter explained the cardinal
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difference:
. . .when the boy had his whole piece of ground
to sow and be given a half of the crops, he was
not a servant but a partner - a master. The
moment you draw the line under the new law that
boy becomes your servant at once. . -As soon as
you draw the line of your farm and say *You can
sow this for yourself,* he is your servant, . .65
Clearly this was potentially a major victory for the master class.
Of course, legal procedure in local courts constituted only the tip of
the iceberg in the whole structure of social control on the farms, and what
happened in local courts often reflected very imperfectly the rules of
legal procedure and the formal provisions of the statute book. The infor-
mal face of the law in local courts was not greatly affected by the acti-
vities of legislators. But extending the criminal law to encompass all
farm tenants was an important symbolic act, provided new sources of intimi-
dation or threat, and occasionally enabled individual farmers to enforce
their will at crucial points in the transformation of productive relation-
ships on their land by direct resort to criminal prosecution.66
By 19t4 many of the preconditioning factors behind the rural crisis were
receding. The drought which began in 1913 became more serious. More im-
portantly, the outbreak of war brought the financial boom to an end. The
Land Bank severely curtailed its activities, and private loan capital vir-
tually dried up. The private banks instituted a policy of reducing their ad-
vances to the farming community as rapidly as possible. The Boer Rebellion
which was prompted by the government's decision to invade German South West
Africa on behalf of the British Smpire, caused a stagnation in trade as mer-
chants' stocks throughout the maize districts were commandeered by the Rebel
forces, paralysing the credit system. This resulted in a slump in land
prices - by as much as 25 per cent in some of the highveld maize districts.67
One consequence of all this might possibly have been a resurgence of the
peasant sector. Further, when in 1916 the Natives Land Commission,
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to subsume tenant production far more tightly under the organisational control
of white farmers, to channel a greater proportion of the profits of their
enterprise in the direction of their landlords, and to place general limits
on their capacity for accumulation and self-enrichment. The most devastating
immediate manifestation of these developments was the forced sale of much
of their livestock, over and above those required for production and immediate
subsistence (such as milk cows). The significance of the 1913 Land Act and
the great spate of forced removals that it sparked off lay not in its effec-
tiveness in abolishing sharecropping, as was the Act's formal intention, but
in the tighter grip which landholders were able to exert over their tenants*
productive activities and the more efficient siphoning off of their surpluses.
The Act had social consequences which were quite different from those which
a legalistic reading of its provisions would lead one to expect. On the
other hand, the Act, while relatively ineffective in relation to the quite
unrealistic projections of its progenitors, did provide part of the statutory
framework within which future struggles over resources and control over labour
could be fought.
When the human dimensions of conflict are investigated, the emergence
of a white supremacist rural political economy in early twentieth century
South Africa seems less than inevitable or unproblematic. The benefits to
be derived from suppressing the black rural economy were not universally
apparent amongst rural whites. Further, state interventions were often te-
nuous and inconclusive. The instruments of coercion and control - the courts,
the police, the law book - seldom had a decisive impact on social relations
in isolation. Hard ideological labour was required to mobilise racial ener-
gies for the extension of white control over rural production. This heightened
consciousness and assertiveness was not easily won.
The extension of white control over production was not directly the re-
sult of the Land Act, but of concerted action and collusion amongst landlords
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- together with great pressure brought to "bear on those landlords who allowed
too great a degree of independence and scope for accumulation to their tenants.
This combined assertiveness was not easily achieved. A crescendo of agita-
tion, proselytising, organising and intimidation reached its peak with the
passing of the 1913 Act, The purpose was not primarily to destroy the black
tenant farmers, but to harness their skills and their capital resources more
tightly to the profit of their landlords. Sharecropping was not yet suppressed;
it was transformed.
Our purpose has not been to reveal the ^turning point' in the emergence
of capitalist agriculture; in truth, historians are likely to discover *tur-
ning points' at any number of stages in the unfolding of the twentieth century,
depending on the temporal dimensions of their investigations. It would be pre-
sumptious to claim that we have drawn the curtain on the era of peasant as-
cendancy, or launched agricultural capitalism on its triumphal march into the
future. What can be claimed for these years of crisis, is that they did pro-
vide the first indication, albeit only in the most advanced heartland of the
arable highveld, of the forces that accumulating white farmers could array
on their side when the circumstances were propitious for their use. In fact
the capitalisation of white agriculture was an unsustainable, cyclical, un-
even development, manifested in different areas at different times, and ul-
timately achieved only with the massive support of an advanced capitalist
state. But the years under discussion and in the area with which we are most
concerned, there is no doubt that in many black farmers* .memories, things
were never quite the same again. The sharecroppers quickly lost their
petty-bourgeois pretensions, Sharecropping communities no longer had the
self-confidence to build schools, carve desks and hire teachers. Increasingly
rarely were sharecroppers able to invest in upward social mobility by sending
their sons to Kilnerton Institute. Those who sought to elevate themselves
or their children into the new elite found less and less that rural production
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provided them with a viable base. Typically the religion of the sharecrop-
pers of a later era was no longer Anglicanism, Methodism or Presbyterianism.
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Increasingly the sharecroppers church was to be a separatist one.
The epicentre of the developments described here was to be found in the
northern Orange Free State, where the capitalisation of agriculture had pro-
ceeded furthest and the exploitation of the soil was most intense. In the
western Transvaal, where intensive maize farming was a later development,
sharecropping seems to have become really ubiquitous only in the 1920s and
1930s. The history of black tenant farming has varied significantly from
region to region- Some informants grew up in labour tenant households in
the Orange Iree State, only to take to sharecropping as adults further north.70
The frontier of white capitalist farming has advanced sporadically and gra-
dually. Indeed, it would not be surprising to find that it also receded at
times. But even this might eventually seem too schematic a formulation; we
might yet discover that local experiences were sui generis, and not simply
variations of period. Only oral research will illuminate these issues.
Nevertheless, in the end, the frontier was to close finally with the mec-
hanisation of production and the stripping of black resources. The expro-
priation of the "black spots''try the Nationalist government, many of them farms
acquired in the few years prior to the prohibition of black land purchase in
1913, signifies the final triumph of the political economy of white supremacy
in the rural highveld. The significance of the events described in "this paper
is that for the first time white farmers in the arable heartland of the high-
veld were able to intervene decisively to turn back the tide of black accumu-
lation on the land in a period of rapid productive expansion, and to harness
black production, resources and skills more fully to the benefit of their
white landlords.
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3» 'Populism" is used to refer to the movement of mass mobilisation amongst
rural whites in pursuit of indigenous accumulation and white supremacy,
spurred "by the encroachments of big capital and the expansion of the black
rural economy which accompanied the rise of urban industry. Populism
was anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist in i ts rheoric, but only in re-
lation to big concentrations of capital, particularly merchant and f i -
nance capital, which allegedly were bent on monopolising landed resources.
The populists* self-image was of a classless democracy of small (white)
property-holders whose harmonious self-sufficiency had been rudely shat-
tered by the intervention of foreign capital. The ideological pacemakers
were the small-town Afrikaner petty-bourgeoisie (the politicians, lawyers,
teachers, and churchmen); and the readiest response came from the.small
men amongst the rural whites - those on the edge of respectability who were
most vulnerable in the face of middlemen, financiers and speculators. On
the other hand, the most marginalised poor whites - the 'dangerous classes*
- were often likely to resist the cultural interventions of the petty-
bourgeoisie; and the more prosperous landed whites with sources of income
from other capitalist sectors were similarly unlikely to be responsive to
populist agitation.
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3 a See T. Keegan, 'The Sharecropping Economy on the South African Highveld
in the iSarly Twentieth Century*, Journal of Peasant Studies, 10, 2/3,
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Transvaal were owned by absentees. Ten years earlier the proportions were
probably higher. (U.G. 13-1927» Report of Agricultural and Pastoral Pro-
duction, 1924-5-) Host such land (even where i t was nominally leased to
a white middleman) was worked by black sharecroppers. Many farms occupied
by their owners were worked (at least in part) by black sharecroppers too.
Many others were reliant on black tenants' oxen and other means of pro-
duction in some degree. Undercapitalisation was the normal condition of
white farming.
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